United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

The defendants, Johnson (driver) and Pearce (passenger), argued the officers lacked either reasonable suspicion or probable cause for this stop, and therefore, it was unlawful under the Fourth Amendment, and thus any evidence obtained as a result of the stop and the subsequent search of the vehicle must be suppressed.

The officer entered a known high-crime area in his marked police cruiser. The Officer observed Johnson exit a vehicle, glance towards him, hunch over, place his right hand in the small of his back, and start backing away. Based on his "own experience and specialized training," the officer reasonably suspected "Johnson had a weapon and was getting ready to fire."

When combined with the fact Johnson was engaged in such behavior in an area known for criminal activity and on a street where a crime-related homicide had recently occurred, the officer's observations provided a sufficient basis for temporarily detaining Johnson to determine whether or not he was actually engaged in wrongdoing. The court held the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Johnson for a brief investigatory detention and to conduct a protective pat-down to ensure he was not carrying any weapons.

As Perce himself was not seized or detained in any manner during the officer’s initial stop of Johnson, the court held Pearce did not have standing under the Fourth Amendment to challenge the officer's initial stop of Johnson.

The district court properly denied the defendants' motions to suppress the evidence.

The case was affirmed. United States v. Pearce, case no. 07-3146/3193, released July 3, 2008.

Michigan Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals held that the People of the State of Michigan could charge defendants for offenses occurring after the effective date of the amended MCLA 257.625 based on prior drunk driving convictions occurring more than 10 years before the effective date of the amendment.

On March 23, 2007, the Isabella County Prosecutor’s Office charged the defendant, Perkins, with OWI-Third Offense. He had four prior drunk driving convictions, including convictions in 1990, 1992, and 1993.

Then May 21, 2007, the Isabella County Prosecutor’s Office charged another defendant, Lesage, with OWI-Third Offense. He had three prior drunk driving convictions, one in 1975 and two in 1991.

Because both defendants had two or more prior OWI related convictions, they were subject to enhanced sentences under “Heidi’s Law.” Before the amendment, a defendant was guilty of a felony only if convicted of 2 or more drunk driving offenses within the prior 10 years. “Heidi’s Law” eliminated the 10-year time frame and allowed the use of any prior drunk driving convictions in enhanced sentencing, regardless of the time lapse between it and the present offense.

The Court concluded the trial court erred in ruling that amended MCLA 257.625 violated ex post facto protections. Additionally, the Court concluded while “Heidi’s Law” worked to the defendant’s disadvantage, the amendment did not attach legal consequences to their previous offenses. “Rather, the amendment made the consequences of their current offenses, which occurred after January 3, 2007, more severe based on defendant’s prior convictions.”

The court reversed and remanded the trial court’s orders granting defendants’ motion to quash and remanded the cases for further proceedings. People v. Perkins, case no. 281957, released August 19, 2008.