Defendant drove a pickup truck over a fire hose firefighters were using to extinguish a fire. A police officer activated the overhead flashers of his patrol vehicle and stopped defendant’s truck. The officer recognized defendant, but asked for his driver’s license, proof of insurance, and registration because
he intended to cite him for driving over the fire hose.

After the officer asked defendant for the documents three or four times, he flipped it through a partially opened window and said “here you go, Bozo.” He told the officer he was leaving and would be back for the ticket, and drove a few feet. The officer ordered him to stop, he stopped, but said he was going to leave. The officer ordered him to exit the truck, and said he would be arrested if he continued to leave. Defendant refused to exit the truck. The officer testified he was going to arrest defendant for hindering or obstructing an officer if he did not get out. The officer jumped off the running board as defendant drove off. Defendant testified he drove off only after the officer “went berserk” and shot something at him.

After being convicted, defendant moved for a new trial and alternatively requested a directed verdict based on a claim there was insufficient evidence to establish the officer was lawfully performing his duties before defendant’s flight. The lower court denied the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict
concluding there was sufficient evidence for the prosecutor to proceed.

The Court of Appeals agreed and held that the Prosecutor could charge the defendant with fourth-degree fleeing or eluding a police officer. The court concluded the police officer was attempting to detain defendant for the purpose of issuing a citation for driving over the fire hose was sufficient to enable the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt he was acting in the “lawful performance” of his duties to establish an element of fleeing or eluding a police officer.

The case was affirmed. People v. Chapo, case no. 281172, released April 14, 2009.

Defendants were charged with a felony OWI-Third Offense. They had previous OWI convictions prior to the enactment of Heidi’s law. The trial court granted the defendants’ motions to quash, concluding MCL 257.625(9) and (11) as amended were not simply sentencing enhancements because the subsections changed the charged offense from a misdemeanor to a felony, and violated the constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws and the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.

The court of appeals disagreed. The Court held that MCL 257.625(9) as amended, did not violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws. decision. Thus, the trial court erred in ruling application of MCL 257.625 as amended violated the prohibition against ex post facto laws. As to the equal protection claim, defendants did not allege the subsections targeted a suspect class. They failed to establish the amendment was arbitrary and not rationally related to a legitimate government interest.

The court concluded the enhancement provisions were tailored to OWI repeat offenders, and were rationally related to the government’s interest in reducing habitual drunk driving and alcohol-related traffic fatalities.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. People v. Sadows, case no. 286689, released March 19, 2009.

Note: The following other unpublished court of appeals cases reversed the lower court decisions on the same grounds as People v. Sadows:

People v. Hall, case no. 283871, released December 23, 2008;
People v. Hadley, case no. 283280, released March 10, 2009;
People v. Derr, case no. 283985, released February 26, 2009;
People v. Jones, case no. 280698, released January 22, 2009;

See also, People v. Kerr, case no. 285234, released May 26, 2009.