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Federal Case Law United States Supreme Court
The defendant was a passenger
in the back seat of a vehicle
stopped for a license plate
check. The police officer found that
the insurance on the vehicle had been
suspended.
After the traffic stop, the police officer
initiated a conversation with the
defendant that was unrelated to the
reason for the traffic stop. Thereafter,
the officer asked the defendant to exit
the vehicle. The officer conducted a patdown
search of the defendant because
she was concerned for her safety upon
noticing signs that he may have been
affiliated with a gang.
During the pat-down search, the officer
found a gun near his waist; he was
arrested, and a further search found
marihuana. The defendant was charged
with possessing a gun without legal
authorization, possession of marihuana,
and resisting arrest.
The defendant filed a motion to suppress
the evidence. The trial court denied
his motion, and he was convicted of
the gun and marihuana counts, but
not the resisting arrest charge. The
defendant appealed the trial court’s
denial of his motion to suppress, and
the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed
his conviction.
The Arizona Court of Appeals ruled
that the pat-down search was improper
because the encounter with the
defendant had become consensual by
the time the search was conducted. The
Arizona Supreme Court denied review.
The United States Supreme Court
reversed the Arizona Court of
Appeals decision. The Court held
that “a reasonable passenger would
understand that during the time a car is
lawfully stopped, he or she is not free
to terminate the encounter with police
and move about at will.” The Court
further held that “nothing occurred in
this case that would have conveyed to
the defendant that, prior to the frisk, the
traffic stop had ended or that he was
otherwise free to depart without police
permission.”
Therefore, the Court concluded that the
officer was not required by the Fourth
Amendment to give the defendant
an opportunity to depart without first
ensuring that, in so doing, she was not
permitting a dangerous person to get
behind her.
Arizona v. Johnson, case no. 07-1122,
decided January 26, 2009.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit
United States v. Davis
MCL 257.709(1)(c) prohibits
driving with “a dangling
ornament or other suspended
object that obstructs the vision of
the driver of the vehicle, except as
authorized by law.”
A Westland police officer observed
that the defendant had in his vehicle
a four-inch tall “Tweety Bird” airfreshener
doll hanging from his rearview
mirror. Immediately thereafter, the officer
stopped the defendant on suspicion for
violating MCL 257.709(1)(c).
When the officer asked for the defendant’s
driver’s license, the defendant admitted
he did not have one. The officer then
placed the defendant under arrest.
During a search incident to an arrest,
the officer found approximately 24
grams of cocaine base, and a loaded
pistol. The United States Attorney’s
Office charged the defendant with being
a felon in possession of a firearm and
possession of cocaine base with intent
to distribute.
The defendant moved to suppress the
evidence, but the district court denied
his motion. The defendant pled guilty
to both offenses and was sentenced to
188 months in prison. He appealed the
district court’s denial of his motion to
suppress.
The 6th Circuit Court of Appeals
held that MCL 257.709(1)(c) was
unconstitutionally vague. In analyzing
the statute, the Court stated as follows:
“Going forward, however, reliance
on MICH. COMP. LAWS 257.709(1)
(c) to justify similar stops will not
suffice. Michigan has a constitutional
duty to regulate dangling ornaments
in a way that more clearly conveys the
vehicular safety purpose of the statute
and provides better guidance to the
law enforcement officials that enforce
it. Otherwise, we risk authorizing
“a standardless sweep [that] allows
policemen, prosecutors, and juries to
pursue their personal predilections” in
enforcing this law.”
It should be noted that the defendant’s
conviction was affirmed on other
grounds (i.e. good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule applied in this
situation).
United States v. Davis, No. 07-1964,
released December 19, 2008.
Note: On December 31, 2008, the court
withdrew its decision in this case. While
no reason was given by the court for the
withdrawal, the most likely reason is
that the decision violated a federal law
requiring the courts to give proper notice
to states when they determine that a
law is unconstitutional. It is anticipated
that the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals will
render a revised opinion to its original
opinion.
People v. Mullen
Officer Frank Shuler saw
defendant’s car stop at a red
traffic light, pause for a few
seconds, and then proceed through
the red light. The officer effectuated a
traffic stop, and when he approached
the driver’s side window, he smelled
alcohol, and noticed the defendant’s
eyes were bloodshot and watery. The
officer requested the defendant to
perform field sobriety tests, which the
defendant failed.
The officer then conducted a preliminary
breath test (PBT). He testified at the
preliminary examination that he checked
defendant’s mouth before placing him
in the back of the patrol car, waited 15
minutes, and then administered the
test.
Officer Shuler further testified that he
checked defendant’s mouth, and found
it to be empty, but he subsequently
admitted that, when he began to read
defendant his PBT rights, he noticed
that defendant had a little piece of paper
in his mouth. Defendant’s PBT result
was 0.15.
The officer did not disclose in his
affidavit that the defendant had paper in
his mouth less than 15 minutes before
he conducted the PBT.
Based on the affidavit, the magistrate
issued a search warrant for a blood
sample. The blood test revealed that
defendant had a blood alcohol content
of 0.11. Defendant was charged, as a
third offender, with operating a motor
vehicle while intoxicated.
The Circuit Court found that the
officer recklessly omitted information
that the defendant had paper in his
mouth less than 15 minutes before the
administration of the PBT.
The Court of Appeals concluded that the
omission by the Officer of the fact that
the defendant had paper in his mouth
was not material, because defendant
presented insufficient evidence that
the presence of paper in his mouth
would significantly call into question the
accuracy of the PBT result. The court
further concluded that the remaining
information in the search warrant, even
when the improperly omitted information
is removed, is sufficient to form probable
cause to issue a search warrant for the
defendant’s blood. “When reviewing a
search warrant affidavit, we must read
it in a “common sense and realistic
manner, not a crabbed or hypertechinal
manner.”
The court found that the circuit court
erred in determining that a reasonable
magistrate would not have found
probable cause to issue a redacted
search warrant.
The court reversed and remanded the
case to the circuit court.
People v. Mullen, case no. 281202,
released December 23, 2008.
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