The defendant was convicted of OWI, DWLS, and furnishing false information to a police officer.  Defendant was sentenced as an habitual offender, fourth offense, to concurrent terms of 1 to 8 years’ imprisonment. 

The defendant argued the totality of the circumstances surrounding his traffic stop resulted in his being in custody and therefore Miranda warnings were necessary. Miranda warnings are not required unless an individual is subjected to custodial interrogation. In Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 US 420 (1984), the United States Supreme Court held that a police officer briefly detaining a defendant and asking him a number of questions could not fairly be characterized as the functional equivalent of formal arrest.

The Court of Appeals, following the rationale of Berkemer, ruled that the defendant did not produce any evidence showing his detention at the scene prior to his arrest, was not brief or that he was asked an unreasonable number of questions, which would cause a reasonable person to feel he was not free to leave. While the arresting officer testified that from the time he pulled defendant's vehicle over to the time he finished his work with him at the jail, two and a half to three hours passed, there was no evidence as to the amount of time between the initial stop and the questions the officer posed at the scene. The two and a half to three-hour timeframe included the roadside investigation, taking defendant to a local hospital to have his blood drawn, transporting him to the county jail, and the booking process.

From the testimony, the roadside questioning occurred shortly after the defendant's vehicle was stopped. Further, the officer's questions were only related to defendant's identity and whether he had been drinking. Therefore, the court held that the temporary detainment under circumstances giving rise to the officer's suspicions that defendant had been drinking did not result in defendant being "in custody" for purposes of Miranda. Lastly, the court noted that while he was briefly placed in the back of the patrol car before he was actually arrested, he was not handcuffed and he was allowed the exit the patrol car to urinate.

The case was affirmed.

People v. Kulpa, case no. 285892, released December 1, 2009.

Defendant appealed by right from her convictions, following a jury trial, of three counts of operating a motor vehicle while visibly impaired (OWVI) causing death, MCL 257.625(4), and one count of OWVI causing serious impairment of body function, MCL 257.625(5).

Defendant’s conviction arose out of an evening collision between defendant’s pickup truck and a Chevrolet Trailblazer on March 23, 2007. The evidence established that defendant ran a stop sign and crashed into the Trailblazer at the intersection of Harrison and Luce Roads in Gratiot County. As a result of the collision, three of the five occupants in the Trailblazer were killed and a fourth occupant sustained a fractured skull. Defendant contended at trial that she failed to stop at the stop sign because deer on the roadway had distracted her.

The People contended that defendant’s ability to drive was visibly impaired due to the consumption of alcohol earlier that evening. The jury found that the evidence supported that contention and convicted defendant as charged. Defendant argues that plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence of visible impairment.

The Court disagreed and held that based on the established facts and circumstantial evidence, the jury could have reasonably inferred that defendant’s ability to drive her vehicle was visibly impaired, i.e., that it was reduced to the point where an ordinary, observant person would have noticed it.  Therefore, the prosecutor introduced sufficient evidence to establish that defendant’s ability to operate her vehicle was visibly impaired. 

Defendant also argued that the trial court erred in admitting the expert testimony of toxicologist Michele Glinn, Ph.D.  Dr. Glinn used retrograde extrapolation to calculate defendant’s BAC content at the time of the collision. Defendant maintained that the factual basis for the calculation was deficient and that the trial court should have excluded Dr. Glinn’s testimony. The Court found that defendant’s challenges to Dr. Glinn’s testimony addressed the weight of the retrograde extrapolation evidence, not its admissibility.

The case was affirmed.

People v. Hogan, case no. 285492, released November 19, 2009.

Defendant appealed as of right his jury conviction of second-degree murder and OWI causing death.  The trial court sentenced the defendant to concurrent terms of 15 to
30 years in prison on each charge.

On July 19, 2007, the defendant, Roderick Person,  and Victor Gornall, Jr., went to a bar in Alpena at approximately 2:00 a.m. Person and Gornall had been drinking at Person’s home before arriving at the bar. Person persistently asked the bartender for a drink, but was not served any alcohol at the bar because he arrived after last call.

Jean Anderson, Person’s neighbor, was also a patron of the bar that night. Anderson had walked to the bar, so Person offered her a ride home when the bar closed, and she accepted. Gornall was passed out in the back seat of Person’s car. Alpena Police Department Officer William Gohl, who was on duty that night in a marked patrol car, observed Person’s vehicle after it left the bar and noticed that it had a burnt out passenger side headlight.

After Officer Gohl observed other violations, he activated his overhead lights. The defendant’s vehicle continued without stopping and caught up with another vehicle, then abruptly changed lanes and passed it.  Officer Gohl turned on his siren and alerted dispatch that he was following a fleeing vehicle. As the defendant’s vehicle entered a curve in the road, Officer Gohl saw its brake lights briefly and then could no longer see the vehicle. Officer Gohl discovered that Person’s vehicle had left the roadway.  As a result of the crash, one of the passengers was deceased.

The investigation revealed that the defendant’s BAC was 0.17 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood.  The defendant’s speed at the time of the crash was 87 mph.  The defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for second-degree murder.

The court disagreed.  The court noted that the evidence at trial established that defendant’s BAC level at the time of the accident was 0.17 grams per 100 milliliters—more than twice the legal limit.  In addition, the court noted that the defendant was traveling at an excessively high rate of speed, and that this rate of speed is especially egregious.

Therefore, the court held that, viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence and the reasonable inferences stemming from that evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s convictions.

The case was affirmed, but the court vacated the defendant’s sentence on his conviction for OWI causing death and remanded for re-sentencing.  

People v. Person, case no. 286057, released November 19, 2009.

The Monroe County Prosecutor appealed as of right from the circuit court’s decision to suppress evidence found by police in a search of defendant’s vehicle and to dismiss the charge of possession with intent to deliver “Ecstasy.”

A Michigan State Police trooper stopped defendant’s vehicle because it had two air fresheners hanging from the rearview mirror in violation of MCL 257.709(1)(c). The trooper determined that defendant’s two passengers had outstanding warrants and they were placed under arrest.  He then conducted a search of the vehicle incident to the arrests. In a hidden compartment, he found a white athletic sock containing ten clear baggies with 906 multi-colored pills of Ecstasy.

Defendant’s vehicle was licensed in Ohio and he pointed out that the statute contained an express exemption precluding its application to vehicles registered in another state. MCL 257.709(3)(d). Defendant also cited an unpublished federal case, United States v. Acuna-Payan, States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, issued May 23, 2006 (Docket No. 1:05-CR-291), that held that the police lacked probable cause to stop an out-of-state vehicle with a crucifix hanging from the rearview mirror. Defendant argued that the police were not justified in stopping every out-of-state vehicle they observed with some ornament obscuring a portion of the windshield merely to confirm that the vehicle was validly registered.

The court of appeals agreed.  The court stated the stop of a motor vehicle must be based on reasonable suspicion that the driver or the passenger(s) are involved in criminal activity.  The court noted the trooper’s only reason for stopping defendant’s vehicle was his observation that it had two air fresheners hanging from the rear view mirror.

Therefore, the court held that the statutory exemption clearly applied and served to invalidate the vehicle stop, and thus, there was no basis to support the stop of defendant’s vehicle.

The case was affirmed. 

People v. Phillips, case no. 280631, released November 3, 2009.

The People appealed as of right from the circuit court’s order quashing the information charging defendant with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of a controlled substance and causing death, MCL 257.625(4), failing to stop at the scene of a fatal accident, MCL 257.617(3), and vehicular manslaughter, MCL 750.321.

This case arose from a fatal traffic crash that occurred early in the morning on New Year’s Day 2008. A mother was driving with her three children northbound on I-75, in snowy weather, when she was violently struck from behind, causing her car to strike a retaining wall. One of the children died as a result. The driver of the other car did not stop at the scene, and the mother was not able to describe that other car.

Police officers observed defendant, on the morning in question, at a gas station, behind the wheel of a car with fresh and heavy damage to its front end. When the police questioned defendant, who had a fresh cut on his face, he admitted that he had been drinking, and stated that his car was headed north on I-75 when it struck another vehicle as it cut in front of his car. The gas station was within a few miles of the accident site.

The district court bound defendant over for trial on the grounds that the heavy damage to the front of defendant’s car and rear of the victim’s car, the proximity of the gas station where the police found defendant and the crash site, and defendant’s admission to hitting someone on  I-75, constituted probable cause.  Defendant challenged the bind over in the circuit court, which agreed with defendant and dismissed the case.

The court of appeals held that the circuit court erred in granting defendant’s motion to quash because the district court’s bind over decision was not an abuse of discretion. The relevant charges against defendant resulted from a fatal crash that occurred on northbound I-75 in the early morning hours on New Year’s Day 2008. The evidence presented to the district court showed that although the driver of the Taurus could not identify the vehicle that struck it, that same morning defendant was found at a gas station located within minutes of the crash.  At the gas station defendant admitted to being in an accident on northbound I-75 after leaving downtown Detroit, and defendant had a fresh injury to his mouth as perceived by the police officer.

Therefore, the court ruled that this evidence was sufficient under the standard governing bindover decisions to bind defendant over on the pertinent charges.

The case was reversed and remanded.

People v. Auri, case no. 287838, released October 29, 2009.

A jury convicted defendant of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI), third offense, MCL 257.625(1), (9)(c), and operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license, MCL 257.904(1). The trial court sentenced defendant as a fourth habitual offender to 46 to 180 months’ imprisonment for his OWI conviction.

Defendant argued that the trial court should have suppressed the results of a blood alcohol test because the warrant authorizing the search rested on an affidavit containing false or misleading information.

However, the court stated a reasonably cautious person could have concluded a substantial basis existed for believing defendant had violated MCL 257.625 given the affidavit's accurate recitations that: (1) defendant at some point had acknowledged driving the vehicle, (2) he possessed the vehicle's keys, (3) the passerby who assisted him in alighting from the vehicle saw only defendant in the vicinity, and (4) defendant emanated a very strong odor of intoxicants, had trouble standing upright, and slurred his speech.

The court noted that the record revealed absolutely no support for defendant's complaint the officer who prepared the affidavit falsely inserted information.

The court concluded that the search warrant set forth an ample basis for the magistrate’s finding of probable cause that defendant had violated MCL 257.625.

The case was affirmed.

People v. Covell, case no. 284240, released October 6, 2009.