Case Name: Berghuis v. Thompkins

After advising respondent Thompkins of his rights in full compliance with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, Detective Helgert and another Michigan officer interrogated him about a shooting in which one victim died. At no point did Thompkins say that he wanted to remain silent, that he did not want to talk with the police, or that he wanted an attorney. He was largely silent during the 3-hour interrogation, but near the end, he answered “yes” when asked if he prayed to God to forgive him for the shooting. He moved to suppress his statements, claiming that he had invoked his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, that he had not waived that right, and that his inculpatory statements were involuntary.

The jury found Thompkins guilty of first degree murder, and he was sentenced to life without parole.  The trial court denied his motion for new trial.  On appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals rejected both Thompkins’ Miranda and his ineffective-assistance claims.

The Federal District denied his subsequent habeas request, reasoning that Thompkins did not invoke his right to remain silent and was not coerced into making statements during the interrogation, and that it was not unreasonable for the State Court of Appeals to determine that he had waived his right to remain silent. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the state court was unreasonable in finding an implied waiver of Thompkins’ right to remain silent and in rejecting his ineffective-assistance-of counsel claim.

The United States Supreme Court ruled that Thompkins’ silence during the interrogation did not invoke his right to remain silent. The Court stated that “If the accused makes an “ambiguous or equivocal” statement or no statement, the police are not required to end the interrogation, or ask questions to clarify the accused’s intent.” 

The Court noted that there is no principled reason to adopt different standards for determining when an accused has invoked the Miranda right to remain silent and the Miranda right to counsel. 

The court further noted that Thompkins waived his right to remain silent when he knowingly and voluntarily made a statement to police. The record here showed that Thompkins waived his right to remain silent. First, the lack of any contention that he did not understand his rights indicates that he knew what he gave up when he spoke. Second, his answer to the question about God is a “course of conduct indicating waiver” of that right.

The court stated that had he wanted to remain silent, he could have said nothing in response or unambiguously invoked his Miranda rights, ending the interrogation. The fact that he made a statement nearly three hours after receiving a Miranda warning does not overcome the fact that he engaged in a course of conduct indicating waiver. Third, there is no evidence that his statement was coerced. He did not claim that police threatened or injured him or that he was fearful. The interrogation took place in a standard-sized room in the middle of the day, and there is no authority for the proposition that a 3-hour interrogation is inherently coercive.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed, and the case was remanded with instructions to deny the defendant’s petition.  Berghuis v. Thompkins, case no. 08-1470, decided June 1, 2010.

Editor’s Note: Please find a brief summary of the Berghuis v. Thompkins case, from Michigan Solicitor General Eric Restuccia, who argued the case before the United States Supreme Court.

“The Court's decision was written by Justice Kennedy.  He wrote in broad terms, establishing three significant principles.  First, the police need not obtain a waiver before interrogating a suspect but need only inform the suspect of his rights under Miranda and may begin questioning once the suspect acknowledges his rights.  Second, a suspect waives his rights under Miranda once he voluntarily answers questions knowing that he need not do so.  Third, a suspect must unambiguously invoke his right to remain silent if he wishes to invoke his right to cut off questioning - he cannot do so through ambiguous conduct or by merely remaining silent.”

Case Name:  Padilla v. Kentucky

The defendant was a legal resident alien for 40 years. He was charged with transporting large amounts of marijuana in a tractor trailer. Before pleading guilty, he asked his lawyer if he could be deported because of the conviction. His attorney said no, because he had been in the country so long. This advice was inaccurate.

He appealed his plea conviction, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel because he was not properly informed of the deportation consequences of his plea.

Five Justices of the United States Supreme Court held that where the terms of the relevant immigration statute are succinct, clear and explicit in defining the removal consequences of a conviction, an attorney has an affirmative duty to advise a non-citizen client that he will be subject to deportation as a result of the plea. If the law is not succinct and straightforward, the attorney must advise the client that a plea may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences.

Justices Alito and Roberts, concurring in the judgment, would hold it was ineffective assistance for the lawyer to affirmatively mislead the defendant regarding the consequences of his plea. They would further hold that a criminal defense attorney is not required to research immigration law to provide specific immigration law advice.

Rather, the client should be advised that a conviction may have immigration consequences, that immigration law is a specialized field, and they should consult an immigration lawyer if the client wants advice on the subject.

Justices Scalia and Thomas, dissenting, would not extend the 6th amendment right to effective assistance of counsel to advice regarding the collateral consequences of a conviction.

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Kentucky was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with the Court’s opinion. Padilla v. Kentucky, No. 08-651, decided March 31, 2010.

Editor’s Note: Before taking a plea from a non-citizen, be sure to make a record that the judge or defense counsel has complied with their obligations under Padilla.  Moreover, as pointed out in the concurrence and dissent, there are numerous collateral  consequences that directly result from a criminal conviction, such as loss of a driver’s license, a professional license, various federal and state welfare benefits, and the right to vote or own a firearm. There are also potential sentence enhancements for future convictions. The majority’s reasoning is not limited to deportation situations, so be prepared for attempts to expand Padilla beyond its facts.